Rural futures. How much should markets rule? by Bernstein, Henry & Oya, Carlos
Working Paper
October 2014
Food and agriculture
Keywords:
Markets, Agrarian political economy, 
sub-Saharan Africa
Rural futures
How much should 
markets rule?
Henry Bernstein and Carlos Oya
International Institute for Environment and Development 
80-86 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8NH, UK 
Tel: +44 (0)20 3463 7399 
Fax: +44 (0)20 3514 9055 
email: info@iied.org 
www.iied.org
 @iied 
 www.facebook.com/theIIED
Download more publications at www.iied.org/pubs
About the authors
Henry Bernstein, Professor Emeritus of Development Studies, SOAS, 
University of London; Adjunct Professor, College of Humanities and 
Development, China Agricultural University, Beijing
Carlos Oya, Reader in Political Economy of Development, SOAS, University of 
London, contact email: co2@soas.ac.uk
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Bill Vorley of IIED for comments on an earlier draft. 
Produced by IIED’s Natural Resources Group
The aim of the Natural Resources Group is to build partnerships, capacity and 
wise decision-making for fair and sustainable use of natural resources. Our 
priority in pursuing this purpose is on local control and management of natural 
resources and other ecosystems.
Partner Organisations
The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) is a leading global Institution 
for international development research, teaching and learning, and impact 
and communications, based at the University of Sussex. Its vision is a world in 
which poverty does not exist, social justice prevails and sustainable economic 
growth is focused on improving human wellbeing.
The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is a leading independent think tank 
on international development and humanitarian issues. Its mission is to inspire 
and inform policy and practice which lead to the reduction of poverty, the 
alleviation of suffering and the achievement of sustainable livelihoods.
Published by IIED, October 2014
Henry Bernstein and Carlos Oya. 2014. Rural futures: How much should 
markets rule? IIED Working Paper. IIED, London.
http://pubs.iied.org/14639IIED
ISBN 978-1-78431-090-5
Printed on recycled paper with vegetable-based inks.
IIED WOrkIng PAPEr
The paper distinguishes different approaches to 
markets in, and affecting, rural sub-Saharan Africa, 
and present some associated policies, notably 
‘market-friendly’ and ‘market-challenging’. We 
then propose a political economy approach as 
a more satisfactory way of grasping the complex 
social dynamics of ‘real markets’ and their forms of 
unequal power. This is illustrated in relation to the 
class differentiation of ‘small farmers’ and its effects 
for rural ‘livelihood diversification’.
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In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), farmers, and rural 
people more generally, have to make their livelihoods 
and reproduce themselves through market activity (or 
involvement in commodity relations). Understanding 
how they do so and with what effects- from relative well-
being to intense poverty and insecurity - requires careful 
attention to various factors: different kinds of markets, 
and their various determinants and forms of market 
power; and how groups, differentiated by class, gender 
and other social relations, are located in particular 
‘real markets’. 
The question ‘how much should markets rule?’ opens 
a Pandora’s box of issues. For example, does ‘how 
much’ imply larger or smaller spaces of economic 
activity conducted through ‘non-market’ relations and 
processes? And is this non-market activity - whether in 
subsistence production and reproduction (understood 
as taking place ‘outside’ markets), or social relations 
and institutions that permeate and affect markets 
(supporting or subverting their ‘proper’ functioning) - 
carried out in different ways, to different degrees, for 
good or ill? 
This paper presents three different perspectives on 
markets in rural SSA. Firstly, we discuss two main 
variants of ‘market-friendly’ perspectives. Secondly, we 
examine some currently popular ‘market-challenging’ 
perspectives. Finally, we present the key ideas, methods 
and questions relating to a political economy centred 
on connections between ‘real market’ dynamics, power 
relations, social differentiation and complex livelihoods. 
We integrate into our discussion the policy implications 
of each perspective and summarize these at the end of 
the paper.
The first main variant of ‘market-friendly’ perspectives 
is that linked to theory and advocacy of the benefits of 
market-led development, in the form of the ‘Washington 
consensus’ and structural adjustment of the 1980s; 
what we term a ‘market maximizing’ (or market 
fundamentalist approach). The second is the somewhat 
modified policies and practices that followed with the 
‘post-Washington consensus’ since the 1990s, that 
we term ‘markets plus’. The ‘plus’ refers to various 
institutional ‘reforms’ and interventions that aim to make 
markets more ‘friendly’ to the poor, to support the 
livelihoods of small farmers through their participation 
in markets. These include contract farming and public–
private partnerships in which the ‘public’ typically refers 
to some or other form of ‘civil society’ bodies and 
activities. We provide a brief summary of some of the 
principal analytical and empirical criticism of ‘market-
friendly’ perspectives and their applications.
‘Market-friendly’ perspectives do not see any intrinsic 
or necessary tensions between domestic and 
international markets (‘globalization’) in measures to 
foster agricultural growth and overcome rural poverty. 
Such tensions, on the other hand, are central to 
‘market-challenging’ perspectives, especially those 
now widely linked with advocacy of ‘food sovereignty’ 
(FS) and associated with La Vía Campesina (VC), 
the ‘International Peasant’s Movement and the 
‘International Peasant’s Voice’. FS sees agriculture 
today as dominated by a socially unjust and ecologically 
destructive ‘global food system’ under the control 
of international agribusiness to the detriment of 
small farmers and (especially) poor food consumers 
everywhere. The message of FS is anti-capitalist, at 
least in reference to (neoliberal) globalization; hence it 
advocates both strict national regulation of liberalized 
international food markets, as well as an alternative 
model centred on low-input, ecologically friendly food 
production by small farmers and fostering alternative 
links between food growers and consumers, whether by 
modified market or non-market means. 
In our view, what remains missing in the encounters 
and collisions of FS and VC on the one hand, and 
mainstream ‘market-friendly’ perspectives, on the other 
hand, is a deeper and sharper understanding of ‘real 
markets’ for which some of the concepts and methods 
of political economy are needed. The last main section 
of the paper thus provides a brief introduction to and 
illustration of a political economy of ‘real markets’ with 
special reference to rural sub-Saharan Africa.
Agrarian political economy addresses “the social 
relations and dynamics of production and reproduction, 
property and power in agrarian formations and 
their processes of change, both historical and 
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contemporary”. Investigating those relations and 
dynamics, and the diverse practices and social forms 
through which they are manifested, is informed by four 
key questions of political economy:
1.  Who owns what? (social relations of property).
2.  Who does what? (social divisions of labour).
3.  Who gets what? (social distribution of the product 
of labour).
4.  What do they do with it? (reproduction of producers, 
non-producers and the means of production; 
consumption and investment/accumulation).
In capitalism farmers are unable to reproduce 
themselves outside commodity relations, which are 
internalized in their activities and how they organize 
them. It is at this point, of course, that markets and 
market exchange, in all their variety, become central 
to considering the fortunes and prospects of different 
types and groups of farmers and workers in the current 
world economy. Markets, of course, consist of sellers 
and buyers of different kinds of commodities (including 
the commodity ‘labour power’), and the political 
economy of ‘real markets’ concentrates investigation 
on the exchanges between sellers and buyers from 
highly unequal social locations, constituted by relations 
of property and power as indicated by the four key 
question above. For example, the circumstances and 
prerogatives of poor petty traders are fundamentally 
different from those of large-scale wholesale traders and 
exporters. In the same way, poor small-scale farmers 
who depend on various types of insecure activities 
for their survival are fundamentally different from more 
prosperous smallholders or middle- and large-scale 
farmers with the kinds of means of production, capital 
and transport that allows them to benefit from market 
access in ways that other producers cannot.
We illustrate briefly aspects of this approach in terms 
of some central issues in understanding contemporary 
agrarian change in sub-Saharan Africa which are not 
confronted adequately by the ‘market-embracing’ and 
‘market-challenging’ perspectives. In particular, we 
engage with: emerging ideas about ‘informal markets’ 
and whether they represent smallholders’ agency for 
positive change; long-standing processes of social 
differentiation and how they intersect with ‘real market’ 
dynamics; and questions of livelihood diversification in 
light of the causes and consequences of rural social 
differentiation in the context of market liberalization.
In our conclusion on ‘Policy, reality and paradox’ we 
reiterate the policy recommendations of ‘market-friendly’ 
and ‘market-challenging’ perspectives, and suggest 
that they achieve their conceptual congruity - a very 
different matter from their effectiveness in practice - 
through the lack of adequate distance between their 
analytical frameworks and their policy prescriptions. The 
connection in one case is faith in the virtues of markets, 
in the other case, it is faith in the virtues of small farmers 
as exemplars of ‘the peasant way’. We then note that 
the political economy of ‘real markets’, and political 
economy more generally, does not produce a single set 
of policy recommendations and the reasons for that.
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1 
Introduction
In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), farmers – and rural 
people more generally– have to make their livelihoods 
and reproduce themselves through market activity (or 
involvement in commodity relations). Understanding how 
they do so and with what effects– from relative well-
being to intense poverty and insecurity– requires careful 
attention to various factors: different kinds of markets, 
and their various determinants and forms of market 
power; and how groups, differentiated by class, gender 
and other social relations, are located in particular 
‘real markets’. 
In this short paper, we distinguish different approaches 
to markets in, and affecting, rural SSA, and present 
some of their associated policies, that we term ‘market-
friendly’ and ‘market-challenging’. We then propose 
a ‘political economy’ approach as a more satisfactory 
way of grasping the complex social dynamics of 
‘real markets’. 
The question ‘how much should markets rule?’ opens 
a Pandora’s box of issues. For example, does ‘how 
much’ imply larger or smaller spaces of economic 
activity conducted through ‘non-market’ relations and 
processes? And is this non-market activity –whether in 
subsistence production and reproduction (understood 
as taking place ‘outside’ markets), or social relations 
and institutions that permeate and affect markets 
(supporting or subverting their ‘proper’ functioning)– 
carried out in different ways, to different degrees, for 
good or ill? 
In effect, the question points towards a binary system 
of ‘market’ and ‘non-market’ activity. This itself may 
be problematic, not least when non-market activity is 
reduced to a residual component, either explicitly or 
implicitly. How are ‘market’ and ‘non-market’ activities 
articulated, and with what effects, in particular historical 
(which is to say, social) conditions? Such questions 
further suggest that any adequate attempt to answer 
‘how much should markets rule?’ entails attention to 
different kinds of markets, the ways in which these are 
organized, and the effects for unequal distributions of 
market power.
The following are examples of different types of markets 
with their own intrinsic characteristics and different 
dynamics, relevant to rural SSA:
• Factor markets (for land, labour, credit as capital, 
water), each characterized by context-specific 
features; some of these markets (land, credit) are 
far more debated than others (labour) in studies 
of rural Africa (Oya, 2013). Like all markets, these 
are essentially social and, as argued below, their 
functioning and outcomes reflect deeply-rooted 
power relations.
• Input markets are particularly important given that, on 
average, agriculture in SSA displays very low levels 
of input intensity(fertilizers, improved seed varieties 
and pesticides), compared to Asia or Latin America 
(karshenas, 2001). Input use and access to inputs 
are not merely aspects of individual farmers’ decisions 
that impact on their (individual) productivity but are 
matters of macro-level dynamics, i.e. distribution 
networks as well as price dynamics driven by 
macroeconomic trends. 
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• Product or output markets include a variety of primary, 
processed or semi-processed commodities as well 
as by-products, along value chains where processing, 
marketing and branding nowadays constitute key 
sites of value generation and accumulation. For 
example, different markets coexist along the coffee 
value chain, from marketing fresh red berries at farm 
level to selling specialty coffees in niche markets 
in rich countries. An important aspect of these 
output markets is how different layers of a chain are 
connected and governed and how this affects the 
kinds and degrees of competition among producers, 
processors, intermediaries and creditors, and the 
dynamics of upgrading or downgrading (cf gibbon 
and Ponte, 2005).
Other distinctions relate to concern where an exchange 
takes place and the associated level of analysis, for 
example, village-level, district, regional, national and 
international markets, all of which have their own 
specificities, actors, modi operandi and institutions. 
Debates about markets in Africa and how they affect 
rural futures too often treat markets as a general and 
unproblematic category of analysis. They tend to 
disregard significant differences between markets, 
and what ‘more markets’ means in relation to access to 
inputs, upgrading in value chains, land property relations 
or labour conditions.
This paper presents three different perspectives on 
markets in rural SSA. Firstly, we discuss two main 
variants of ‘market-friendly’ perspectives. Secondly, we 
examine some currently popular ‘market-challenging’ 
perspectives. Finally, we present the key ideas, methods 
and questions of a political economy centred on 
connections between ‘real market’ dynamics, power 
relations, social differentiation and complex livelihoods. 
We integrate into our discussion the policy implications 
of each perspective and summarize these at the end of 
the paper.
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2 
Framing markets: 
‘market-friendly’ 
perspectives
Conventional definitions, particularly within neoclassical 
economics, view markets as an institution through 
which sellers and buyers engage in the free exchange 
of goods and services. In the terms of political 
economy, this presupposes a division of labour 
between producers of commodities. It also assumes 
that producers have to use the income from market 
exchange to reproduce themselves that is to replace, 
and perhaps expand, their means of production, and to 
buy their means of consumption. 
The dominant approach since the 1980s generally 
puts markets at the fulcrum of economic activity, and is 
associated with the rise of neoliberalism. Advocates of 
‘the market principle’ or ‘market-friendly’ perspectives 
argue that economic activity is driven by the rational 
self-interest (‘utility maximization’) of individuals to get 
the best deal from what they do. In this framework, 
competition in market exchange– the acts of selling and 
buying– is the engine of efficient resource allocation 
and use in the narrow sense, static allocative efficiency1.
That is, different actors face appropriate signals and 
incentives, such as through market prices which reflect 
preferences, constraints and resource endowments, 
thereby creating basic conditions for faster and 
sustained economic growth. 
Maximizing markets
In the most extreme version of market-friendly 
perspectives, which gained force particularly from 
the 1980s, markets should be as little regulated, or 
‘distorted’, as possible. The notion of distortion itself 
derives from the concept of competitive equilibrium. 
While this approach, commonly labelled ‘neoliberal’, 
expects unregulated markets to yield static allocative 
efficiency, it can also recognize that distributional 
inequality may be an outcome of free market forces. 
However, advocates of the neoliberal approach would 
argue that: (i) resultant inequalities are not unfair as they 
reflect an impartial distribution of benefits, or ‘rewards’, 
according to the differential expertise and energies 
(e.g. ‘entrepreneurship’) of participants in markets; (ii) 
the dangers of strongly regulated markets for economic 
efficiency, and often for distribution too, far outweigh 
those of lightly regulated markets; and (iii) the trickle 
down effect of dynamic growth is that all become better 
off, albeit unequally so. 
1 Static allocative efficiency refers to the best distribution of resources at any given time given technologies and production functions. By contrast, dynamic 
productive efficiency refers to the process of technological catching-up that increases efficiency of production over time and leads to sustained productivity 
growth, a concept that is more central to the concept of economic development.
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In its original diagnostics of rural development problems 
in Africa, the ‘Washington consensus’2 saw the principal 
cause of ‘market failure’ as state interventions in markets 
that ‘distort’ their proper functioning and benefits. The 
landmark ‘Berg report’ (World Bank, 1981) argued 
that state regulation of domestic and international trade, 
fixing of exchange rates, administered prices for many 
crops, and highly inefficient subsidies and extension 
services, were negative for farmers in SSA, imposed 
disincentives to produce more, and more efficiently, 
and hence depressed agricultural livelihoods and rural 
incomes more generally. 
Moreover, the report argued that these sectoral and 
macroeconomic interventions manifested an urban 
bias whereby agriculture was heavily taxed in favour of 
inefficient emerging industries promoted by misguided 
nationalist interventions. The solution was the structural 
adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s, 
which aimed to enforce the policies of the Washington 
consensus through new aid conditionalities. For 
agriculture specifically, this meant rolling back both 
state provision of farm inputs and marketing of outputs 
as key steps towards ‘getting the prices right’, and not 
least the elimination, reform or privatization of state 
marketing boards. 
Market deregulation and competitive market prices 
were seen as essential conditions for stimulating 
agricultural production and trade, thereby contributing 
to overcoming rural poverty. The ‘rural poor’ – typically 
conflated with smallholder farmers – were expected 
to benefit as better functioning markets would lead to 
higher farm gate prices and wider markets. Indeed, this 
approach can also encompass a view of rural poverty 
resulting from lack of integration in markets, and hence 
advocated proactive measures to provide access to 
markets for those otherwise ‘excluded’ from the benefits 
of market participation. In testament to this, the phrase 
‘linking smallholders to markets’ is one of the most 
frequently used in mainstream accounts of agricultural 
development projects since the 1990s. 
Since structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s, 
agricultural liberalization has proceeded unabated 
through different waves of market reforms: from the 
abolition or reinvention of former state marketing boards, 
to the gradual deregulation of most agricultural prices, 
to the privatization of countless rural development 
agencies and institutions (notably agricultural advisory 
services), to the rise of market information systems, and 
to the growing commodification of all spaces of rural life.
At the same time, the ‘maximizing markets’ view that 
has dominated policy agendas since the 1980s has 
been partially qualified, or ‘softened’, over the last two 
decades– even though the supposed benefits of two 
decades of market liberalization still feature in flagship 
reports at the World Bank (cf Anderson et al., 2009). 
An initial ‘market fundamentalism’ (Stiglitz, 2004) has 
given way to a less radical take on the state–market 
dichotomy, without abandoning the centrality of markets 
for rural development. This is reflected in what we call 
the ‘markets plus’ approach.
‘Markets plus’
Concepts of market failures and common reasons 
held to explain them beyond the ‘distortions’ of state 
interventions in markets, such as high transaction costs 
and information asymmetries, provide the basis for much 
economic investigation of markets today. They also 
inform much policy prescription which aims to bring 
‘real’ markets as close as possible to the functioning of 
the abstract ‘market principle’. 
Influenced by new neoclassical development 
economics (Byres, 2003a), itself strongly influenced 
by new institutional economics (cf kydd et al., 2002), 
leading development agencies in Africa have proposed 
alternative institutional arrangements to address market 
imperfections, stimulate production and overcome 
rural poverty. These agencies include the World Bank, 
the Un Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the 
European Union and bilateral agencies.
Much of the World Bank’s current empirical work on 
agrarian issues is still framed through conventional 
neoclassical agricultural economics while introducing 
elements of the post-Washington consensus.3 This 
approach maintains the standard state–market 
dichotomy but warrants a greater role for governments 
through the need to ‘establish the basics’ of 
macroeconomic stability, rural infrastructure, water 
access, education and health. Following this is a 
sequence of interventions that include measures for 
market access (such as information provision and 
contract farming) and institutional innovations for 
providing inputs and carrying out risk management 
(Dorward et al., 2004). Some institutional innovations 
and related reforms have formed part of the broader 
‘good governance agenda’ that has dominated 
mainstream development thinking since the early 2000s 
(Oya, 2011). 
2 This remains a contested term as evident from the exchange between Williamson (who coined it) and Stiglitz (Williamson, 2004; Stiglitz, 2004). The slightly 
narrower definition used by Stiglitz is adequate for the purposes of the analysis in this paper.
3 See Stiglitz (2004) for a definition and Fine (2001) for a critical review.
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The post-Washington consensus (PWC) version of 
‘markets plus’ is partly a response to a large body 
of critical literature that documented the growing 
‘marginalization’ of smallholder farmers in the wake 
of liberalization reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.4 
A key theme in this new mainstream variant is the 
incorporation of smallholder farmers into markets and, 
more specifically, into ‘global agrifood chains’, one of 
the key topics in the World Development Report 2008: 
Agriculture for Development (World Bank, 2007). 
This theme encompasses various recommendations for 
market intervention by government and/or civil society 
to enhance the prospects of particular categories of 
market participants, like ‘small’ farmers. Thus the notions 
of ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ are mainstreamed 
in an emerging narrative that constitutes what Ellis and 
Biggs (2001) called the paradigm of ‘agricultural growth 
based on small-farm efficiency’. These ‘empowering’ 
and ‘enabling’ measures are typically ‘non-market’ in 
character; they are expedients, of shorter or longer 
duration, to improve benefits for targeted categories 
of market participants. ‘Market plus’ recommendations 
occupy a wide range of proposals: from the post-
Washington consensus ‘mainstream’ approach to more 
radical ideas. Central to all these views are claims to 
make markets more ‘pro-poor’. 
Paradoxically, with the arrival of a more state-friendly 
(or less state-unfriendly) PWC, spaces for privatization 
and deregulation have expanded. governments in 
developing countries are now promoting as part of their 
core services private sector and non-governmental 
organization (ngO) delivery of extension services 
and research, typically and historically seen in other 
parts of the world (now developed countries as well 
as fast-growing East Asian economies) as part of core 
government services (Chang, 2009). The effectiveness 
and relevance of such services is expected to increase 
insofar as they are ‘demand-led’, i.e. driven by the needs 
of farmers. In other words, agricultural knowledge and 
technology become increasingly commodified as part of 
the efforts to ‘link smallholders to markets’. 
The market also finds other spaces vacated by the 
withdrawal of State Marketing Boards e.g.in credit 
and insurance markets. Thus, preferred institutional 
innovations at the World Bank and like-minded 
institutions include popular weather-indexed insurance 
schemes or warehouse receipts (World Bank, 2007; 
Dercon, 2005; Dercon et al., 2014) in which private 
providers are expected to play a leading role.
Many of the above-mentioned interventions and new 
ways of thinking about states and markets in agriculture 
fall under the increasingly popular category of public–
private partnerships (PPPs). These partnerships 
generally attempt to align private sector incentives 
with public policy goals, particularly for services and 
public goods designed to benefit the rural poor and 
smallholder producers (Poulton and Macartney, 2012).
Public–private partnerships have already existed in non-
agricultural sectors like health, road construction, water 
and education infrastructure (Warner et al. 2008). Much 
of the excitement and case for PPPs rests on a number 
of assumptions about the relative efficiency of state and 
private institutions and the compatibility of interests in 
cases that can contribute to the expansion of public 
goods. As a result, a large amount of donor funding is 
going to establish PPPs, as a solution to the market 
failures clearly exposed by the rapid market liberalization 
of the 1980s and 1990s. 
For agriculture, there are various types of PPPs, 
each addressing a particular kind of market failure. 
These include capital investment, such as roads and 
agricultural infrastructure; service delivery, notably 
extension services (as noted above); input vouchers; 
research on seed varieties; and guarantees for loans 
to producers, traders and stockists. As Poulton 
and Macartney (2012) document, evidence for 
the effectiveness of these interventions is scarce, 
despite an increase in the funding and number of 
such interventions. While some authors (narrod et 
al., 2009) cite a few examples of success in PPPs to 
help smallholders meet food safety standards in India 
(grape exports) and kenya (green beans), Poulton and 
Macartney (2012) conclude that PPPs may not be able 
to solve many of the market failures they address. This is 
down to contexts of unpredictable and incoherent public 
policy, which abound in Africa, and limited state capacity 
and willingness to design and manage effective PPPs. 
Politics indeed matters, and relying on simple ‘technical’ 
solutions based on assumed mutual compatibility of 
incentives may be naïve. 
One of the key tenets of the ‘markets plus’ PWC 
approaches and PPPs is the role of ‘information 
asymmetries’ and other information imperfections, which 
often lead to ‘principal-agent’ problems and abuses in 
the unregulated market systems. Institutions have made 
significant efforts to improve market information and 
to establish innovative mechanisms that allow small 
farmers to access such information in remote places, 
often taking advantage of wider access to mobile 
phones, through text messaging, for example. 
4 See Havnevik et al. (2007) and Oya (2007a) for surveys of this literature for Africa. 
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A pioneer in this regard is the Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange, a typical public–private partnership 
enterprise, inspired by its founder and former CEO 
Eleni gabre-Madhin, who is planning to help establish 
more commodity exchanges in other countries (gabre-
Madhin, 2012, and 2001 for earlier discussion of the 
theoretical underpinnings of this intervention ).5 The 
basic assumption is that poor smallholder farmers 
need only timely and free information to make adequate 
marketing decisions. When the impact at an individual 
level is aggregated at regional and national levels, the 
result is expected to be much better market articulation 
and integration, one of the key deficits in the agricultural 
liberalization reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. This a 
good example of the preoccupations of mainstream 
institutionalist economists like gabre-Madhin and of 
much research in institutions like the International Food 
Policy research Institute and Michigan State University, 
which are highly influential in studies of African 
agriculture, especially concerning agricultural markets 
and rural livelihoods.
‘Linking smallholders to markets’ also implies some 
institutional actions that require collective action and 
the organization of otherwise highly vulnerable farmers 
(Vorley et al., 2007). Two types of related interventions 
stand out in the ‘market-plus’ approach: contract farming 
(outgrowing schemes) and producer organizations. It 
is striking that pre-liberalization state marketing boards 
frequently operated vertically integrated contract 
farming, and more often than not organized marketing 
systems around rural cooperatives precisely to reduce 
transaction costs (Lele and Christiansen, 1989; Little 
and Watts, 1994). The key difference now is that 
marketing systems are increasingly led and organized 
by the private sector, including emerging arrangements 
for supermarket sourcing, or civil society organizations 
(ngOs) (Weatherspoon and reardon, 2003; neven et 
al., 2009). 
generally, the new systems have limited outreach, and 
are driven by profitability and risk, compared to former 
state marketing boards whose mandate was to provide 
services for all farmers. Contract farming schemes often 
result in anti-competition biases through market-defying 
interventions: corporate buyers attempt to avoid the risk 
of side-selling by hard-to-monitor scattered smallholder 
farmers through contracts that demand exclusivity and 
associated penalties, resulting in monopsonies in large 
territorial ‘concession areas’ (Oya, 2012; Little and 
Watts, 1994). 
Producer organizations are often designed to 
circumvent private intermediaries in order to add value 
to producers’ output, as in ‘smallholder-friendly’ lobbies 
like Fairtrade. However, there is little evidence that these 
initiatives reach all strata of rural society and an elite-
bias may be quite common (Bernard and Spielman, 
2009; Liverpool-Tasie, 2014; Vorley et al., 2012). Most 
of these interventions are presented in the form of 
‘win–win’ scenarios and attempt to make the survival 
of smallholder farmers compatible with the growing 
expansion of global agribusiness in African agriculture. 
But these ‘win–win’ solutions must always navigate 
the tension between improving ‘market access’ and 
introducing non-market drivers that stifle competition.
The ‘win–win’ innovations proposed are at the 
‘market-friendly’ end of the spectrum of ‘markets plus’ 
recommendations. More radical market reform includes 
types of collective action, often ‘from below’, albeit 
supported ‘from above’ by states. This action aims to 
strengthen the position of small farmers as participants 
in markets by, if necessary, subordinating mechanisms 
of competition and/or more powerful market actors 
to forms of positive discrimination in favour of small 
producers and the rural poor more generally. In short, 
and for present purposes, reform becomes more radical 
the more that non-market factors and processes are 
advocated. As the scope of the non-market factors is 
enlarged at the expense of market dynamics, then it can 
begin to overlap with anti-market perspectives.
5 The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) has a wider range of objectives both at macro and micro level. At macro level, the main rationale was to set up 
an institution that could centralize information on agricultural markets and particularly for export crops like coffee, which are central to Ethiopia’s quest for 
foreign exchange. In addition, and as suggested in their own website (http://www.ecx.com.et/), ECX is expected to contribute to providing buyers and sellers of 
agricultural commodities with ‘assured quality, quantity, payment, and delivery’, through a process that amounts to having much more control over all agricultural 
market intermediaries and their operations. This is expected to reduce or even eliminate abuses — cheating and non-payment — which often characterize the 
malfunctioning of unregulated agricultural markets in many poor agrarian economies.
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3 
Market-challenging 
perspectives
Probably the highest profile challenge to mainstream 
market perspectives today is that associated with 
notions of ‘food sovereignty’ (FS), defined as:
“the right of nations and peoples to control 
their own food systems, including their own 
markets, production modes, food cultures and 
environments...as a critical alternative to the 
dominant neoliberal model for agriculture and 
trade” (Wittman et al., 2010, p. 2). 
The FS perspective thus resonates a broad rights-based 
approach that derives from a concern with social justice, 
and the needs of (especially small) farmers in the global 
South, Arguably, the starting point of this perspective, 
both analytically and historically, is its implacable 
opposition to the liberalization, or globalization, of 
international markets, considered to underpin the 
functioning of an international food regime or system 
dominated by ‘corporate industrialized agriculture’ to the 
detriment of small farmers in the South (or everywhere).
This perspective is strongly, if not exclusively, associated 
with Vía Campesina (VC), which describes itself 
as the ‘International Peasant’s Movement and the 
‘International Peasant’s Voice’. VC claims to be the 
largest transnational social movement in the world 
today– a ‘pro-poor peasant movement made up of more 
than 200 million members in 79 countries’– with its 
secretariat currently based in Zimbabwe.6 Its African 
wing believes in 
• Championing Small African Family Farming/
production Systems based on agro-ecological and 
Indigenous approaches that sustain food sovereignty 
and the livelihoods of communities while not 
neglecting other appropriate farming models;
• resisting the Corporate Industrialization of African 
agriculture which will result in massive land grabs, 
displacement of indigenous peoples especially the 
pastoral communities and hunter gatherers and the 
destruction of their livelihoods and cultures;
• African driven solutions to problems in Africa and a 
belief in the richness of ourselves.7
As this statement shows, opposition to ‘globalization’ 
is not just about combating liberalized commodity 
trade, and calling for the regulation of foreign trade 
more or less extensively to promote local or national 
food production, at the cost of export production 
if necessary. In fact, the hostility to ‘corporate 
industrialized agriculture’ extends to the import or 
imposition of certain technologies developed and 
dominated by global agribusiness, such as gM seeds 
and other improved hybrid seed varieties; the import 
and/or domestic production of ‘globalized’ processed 
food staples and fast foods, driven by transnational 
agrifood companies and wholesale and retail 
6 http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/sustainable-peasants-agriculture-mainmenu-42/1493-building-a-peasant-revolution-in-
africa, accessed 09.02.2014. 
7 http://www.africanbiodiversity.org/content/alliance_food_sovereignty_afsa, accessed 09.02.2014.
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conglomerates; the sourcing of high-value horticultural 
products (fresh fruits and vegetables, cut flowers, 
and also aquatic commodities) by global agrifood 
companies, at the expense of domestic food production; 
and, highly topically and controversially, ‘land grabbing’ 
by corporations, sovereign wealth funds and other 
financial entities, much of it driven by an interest in 
‘capturing’ extensive land areas and water resources for 
large-scale export production of food and biofuels. 
Combined with this stance, there is a strong ecological 
current in FS which advocates a virtuous model of 
low external-input farming (the ‘peasant way’), and 
the protection and promotion of indigenous ways 
of farming and of biodiversity. This counterposes 
the environmentally and socially destructive realities 
of corporate industrialized agriculture that is highly 
dependent on external, and often imported, inputs, and 
that privileges large-scale over small-scale agriculture.
What alternative perspectives on markets are suggested 
by FS? Most evidently, FS as the right of nations and 
peoples to control their own food systems entails 
rigorous national regulation. This is necessary to control 
effectively foreign trade in food and other agricultural 
commodities, both imports and exports, as well as the 
interest of foreign capital in selling energy-intensive 
inputs and buying, or otherwise acquiring, large areas 
of land and water resources for the production of food, 
biofuel and livestock.
The envisaged nature and role of domestic markets 
in facilitating self-sufficient and sustainable food 
production and consumption within countries is less 
developed in FS; ‘the right of nations and peoples 
to control... their own markets’ is so far more of an 
aspiration than a strategy. One strand of FS is to 
centre the notion of ‘the peasant way’ on subsistence 
production by farming households and communities– 
that is, growing enough food for their own needs with 
at best some surplus in good years. This may generate 
an attractive image of very localized self-reliance and 
‘autonomy’ –a much favoured term in the FS discourse 
(Ploeg, 2008: 2013) along with ‘local’ and ‘indigenous’ 
or ‘traditional’– but begs the question of where the 
food will come from to supply those who do not grow 
enough for their own consumption. The latter includes, 
as is increasingly recognized, the very large numbers of 
the rural poor who purchase at least a substantial part 
of their food needs, as well as the burgeoning urban 
populations of SSA. It is also not clear how an ambitious 
programme of state or donor support to such forms of 
food production and distribution would be resourced in 
terms of finance, logistics and labour.
A second strand concerning the ‘market question’ in 
FS it to recognize small farmers as actual or potential 
producers of food staples surplus to their own needs, 
and who are capable, through collective action, of 
negotiating the terms of their participation in markets, 
and indeed influencing those terms to their advantage. 
They may do this through overcoming the constraints 
of ‘price-taking’ by organizing cooperatives, by creating 
their own ‘nested markets’ that connect them directly 
with consumers, or by augmenting incomes from 
farming with cooperative processing and other value-
adding activities and services, like ‘eco-tourism’. Such 
arrangements aim to facilitate the distribution of food 
and hence differ in purpose and organization from 
other kinds of measures aimed at improving the returns 
to smaller producers of export crops, like various 
Fairtrade schemes. 
The message of VC is anti-capitalist, at least in 
reference to capitalist globalization (neoliberal 
globalization). It is not necessarily anti-market as 
its vision of FS can encompass a role for domestic 
markets, even if, as noted, this has not been elaborated 
or tried and hence remains an aspiration within the 
framework of its methodological nationalism. Moreover, 
those ‘alternative’ markets have to be organized in 
ways that reward the efforts of small farmers as well 
as supplying adequate, healthy and affordable food 
to poorer consumers, both urban and rural. This is 
challenging, to say the least, and assumes a potential 
congruence in the interests and preferences of these 
different constituencies.
So, what is the significance of FS (and Vía Campesina) 
to current debates on agricultural policy in and for 
SSA, and the question of how much markets should 
rule? Some commentators (Dorward, 2009; Wiggins, 
2009; Murphy, 2012) observe that there is space 
for a dialogue, mainly because aid agencies and 
governments are more self-critical in the wake of the 
global financial crisis and, more specifically, the world 
food ‘crisis’ of 2007–2008 and its aftermath including 
arguments that this was substantially provoked by 
speculative trading in agricultural commodity futures 
and the continuing price volatility of internationally 
traded food and feed commodities (ghosh, 2010). The 
concerns that have arisen easily connect with, and are 
reinforced by (not least for VC), longer-standing issues 
like climate change and environmental sustainability, 
the reduction of rural poverty and the future of small-
scale farming, and also, of more recent provenance, the 
controversies over land grabs.
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Vía Campesina has achieved a high political profile 
with perhaps some impact on official development 
institutions; for example, in its new accord with the FAO 
(“a milestone in the partnership between FAO and civil 
society organizations”8), and its central involvement 
in an ongoing campaign to enact a Un declaration, 
and eventually convention, on the rights of peasants 
(Edelman and James, 2011). As a political project, VC 
encourages and supports resistance to such features 
of globalization as the ‘dumping’ of cheap food imports, 
new technologies like gM seed and the corporations 
that promote them, ‘biopiracy’, and, of course, 
land grabs. 
This resolute opposition to global markets, the 
corporations believed to control them, and the 
international institutions held to regulate them 
in the interests of corporate capital (notably the 
WTO) represents the most radical challenge of 
VC to mainstream perspectives that both embrace 
international markets and seek to find ways that 
make them ‘work better for the poor’, and specifically 
small farmers. In this sense, VC not only thinks the 
‘unthinkable’ but seeks to act on it.9
On the other hand, there appears more scope for 
an interchange between some of VC’s ideas about 
promoting domestic food markets and supporting small-
scale farmers, and the mainstream embrace of markets. 
Indeed, they both share a ‘small-farm-first’ discourse 
which has dominated the rural development landscape 
for the past 60 years (Ellis and Biggs, 2001, p. 440). 
This is especially so as the market-friendly mainstream 
approach tries to incorporate, at least discursively, civil 
society organizations as key actors in development 
processes in the interests of ‘good governance’, 
‘participation’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘traditional’ or 
‘community’ social practices and values, as an element 
in building ‘social capital’.10
For example: self-organized ‘farmer-to-farmer’ networks 
for the exchange of seed and farming knowledge that 
feature strongly in FS advocacy (Holt-giménez, 2006),11 
the rehabilitation of soil and water resources that deploy 
(labour-intensive) indigenous or local technologies and 
knowledge (reij et al., 2009; Woodhouse, 2012), and 
cooperatives to buy and distribute inputs, bulk up crops 
for sale, invest in value-adding activities, and negotiate 
on behalf of small farmers with private firms and 
with government. 
Vía Campesina’s project and embrace of FS– and 
the reasons why, and degrees to which, it may be 
considered ‘quixotic’ or ‘emancipatory’ (Edelman 
and James, 2011) –will continue to be strongly 
argued. Some of the issues include more general and 
longstanding debates about the virtues and benefits 
of small-farm or large-farm paths of agricultural 
development. Here, VC’s commitment might allow 
limited alliances, at least, with some in more mainstream 
circles (for example, Wiggins, 2009) in common cause 
against advocates of a large farm path (for example, 
Collier and Dercon, 2009). 
The hostility of VC towards liberalized global markets 
and corporate agribusiness is much less likely to 
find any allies in the mainstream, despite the latter’s 
occasional expression of concern about agricultural 
subsidies in OECD countries and some of the 
mechanisms and effects of contemporary financial 
markets. However, as we noted, on the ‘civil society’ 
side there may be quite specific types of practice and 
organization advocated by VC which connect with more 
mainstream positions.
In our view, what remains missing in the encounters 
and collisions of VC and FS on the one hand, and the 
mainstream perspective that embraces markets on the 
other, is some of the concepts and methods of political 
economy which provide a deeper and sharper approach 
to grappling with ‘real markets’. It is these concepts that 
we turn to next. 
8 http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/201824/icode/, accessed 15.06.2014
9 What is ‘unthinkable’ in today’s discourse and its conditions of existence is acknowledged by Wiggins (2009, p. 12) who observes that “the kind of support to 
farmers seen in Asia in the past, particularly subsidies on fertilizer, irrigation water and rural power, is unthinkable today”. 
10 And ‘empowerment’, a point at which some FS advocacy overlaps with an older prescription concerning the rural poor, namely ‘putting the last first’ (Chambers, 
1983). 
11 For African examples, some of which articulate ‘peasant emancipation’ from NGOs, see http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/
sustainable-peasants-agriculture-mainmenu-42/1493-building-a-peasant-revolution-in-africa, accessed 09.02.2014. Note too the strongly political conception 
of ‘farmer-to-farmer’ networks, well articulated by Holt-Giménez (2006) and by Kloppenburg (2010) with reference to seed sovereignty: that is, as a vehicle 
of farmer self-emancipation from the ‘rule of (ostensible) experts’ in government extension services and the sales teams of seed and other agribusiness 
companies.
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4 
The political economy 
of ‘real markets’
The object of agrarian political economy is usefully 
defined by The Journal of Agrarian Change as “the 
social relations and dynamics of production and 
reproduction, property and power in agrarian formations 
and their processes of change, both historical and 
contemporary”. Investigating those relations and 
dynamics, and the diverse practices and social forms 
through which they are manifested, is informed by four 
key questions of political economy (Bernstein, 2010):
1.  Who owns what? (social relations of property).
2.  Who does what? (social divisions of labour).
3.  Who gets what? (social distribution of the product 
of labour).
4.  What do they do with it? (reproduction of producers, 
non-producers and the means of production; 
consumption and investment/accumulation).
These are analytical questions that point to social 
differences and divisions of class and gender above all, 
and can apply to social entities at scales ranging from 
individual farming households to the global economy. 
In an era of capitalism, investigating the social relations 
and dynamics that shape farming involves attention 
to how farmers – of very different types and in very 
different ways – are constituted by their locations, 
both social and spatial, within generalized commodity 
relations; farmers are unable to reproduce themselves 
outside those relations, which are internalized in their 
activities and how they are organized. It is at this point, 
of course, that markets and market exchange, in all their 
variety, become central to considering the fortunes and 
prospects of different types and groups of farmers and 
workers in the current world economy.
In the face of the intrinsic complexity as well as diversity 
of markets and market exchange, which are subject to 
many determinations at various levels including global, 
national and local, agrarian political economy demands 
a method of investigating ‘real markets’ and their 
effects as distinct from idealized notions of ‘the market’, 
universal ‘market principles’ or conventional ways of 
modelling markets. Of course markets consist of sellers 
and buyers of different kinds of commodities (including 
the commodity ‘labour power’), and the political 
economy of ‘real markets’ concentrates investigation on 
the exchanges between sellers and buyers from highly 
unequal social locations, constituted by relations of 
property and power. 
While mainstream analysis tends to think in terms of 
occupational categories and how they relate to each 
other in markets (producers, traders, processors and 
exporters, for example) a political economy of ‘real 
markets’ breaks down each of these categories in 
terms of their position in the social hierarchy and their 
relative power vis-à-vis others. The circumstances and 
prerogatives of poor petty traders are fundamentally 
different from those of large-scale wholesale traders 
and exporters (Meagher, 2003). In the same way, poor 
small-scale farmers who depend on various types of 
insecure activities for their survival are fundamentally 
different from more prosperous smallholders or 
middle- and large-scale farmers with the kinds of 
means of production, capital and transport that allows 
them to benefit from market access in ways that other 
producers cannot.
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Highly unequal power relations between and within 
these broad categories have effects for the character 
and functioning of specific markets and their forms of 
regulation, and hence for the returns that different kinds 
of sellers and buyers derive from their participation in 
markets. Moreover, conventional meanings of market 
‘regulation’ (and calls for ‘deregulation’) miss the vital 
point that “all markets are structured by state action: the 
only variation is how the terms of their variation are set” 
(Mackintosh, 1990, p. 50).
Our approach to ‘real markets’ rests on a substantial 
body of theoretical and empirical work by the authors 
(including Bernstein, 2010; 2013; 2014; Bernstein and 
Woodhouse, 2001; Oya, 2007b; 2012). It also draws 
on a well-known political economy of rural markets in 
South Asia (Crow, 2001; Harriss-White, 2008), and 
can only be stated selectively and schematically here. 
We prefer to use our limited space to illustrate aspects 
of this approach in terms of some central issues in 
understanding contemporary agrarian change in SSA 
which are not confronted adequately by the ‘market-
embracing’ and ‘market-challenging’ perspectives 
discussed above.12 In particular, we engage with: 
emerging ideas about ‘informal markets’ and whether 
they represent smallholders’ agency for positive change; 
long-standing processes of social differentiation and 
how they intersect with ‘real market’ dynamics; and 
questions of livelihood diversification in light of the 
causes and consequences of rural social differentiation 
in the context of market liberalization.
Are ‘informal markets’ the 
way forward?
‘real markets’ may be formal or informal, according to 
Vorley et al. (2012, p. 3), among others, who propose 
that “instead of how to make markets work for the poor, 
we need to look at how the poor make markets work 
for them”.13 They distinguish this stance on the agency 
of poor farmers in their own empowerment as market 
actors from the views (i) that integration in global and 
national value chains via formal markets is the way 
forward for most small farmers (as discussed above), 
and (ii) that rights-based approaches downplay agency 
in market production and exchange. They see informal 
markets–‘markets in the spaces outside the formal 
economy’ (ibid, p. 19) –as the environment most suited 
to the agency of small producers in a world economy 
which, moreover, exhibits an ‘upsurge in informality’ 
(ibid, p. 24).
Despite the authors’ best intentions, informal markets 
continue to be conceived as a residual of formal 
markets’, and in so encompassing a manner (like the 
residual term of most such binaries) as to limit useful 
application to the great variety of ‘real markets’ and their 
forms of unequal market power. 
Markets and the social 
differentiation of small 
farmers
The intersection between dynamics of ‘real markets’ 
(regardless of their relative degrees of formality) and 
agrarian change places social differentiation in the 
countryside at the centre of analysis in agrarian political 
economy. To be sure, it has become more common 
recently to acknowledge the ‘heterogeneity’ and 
‘differentiation’ of small farmers (Vorley et al., 2012; 
Jayne et al., 2003; Wiggins, 2009; Dorward, 2009; 
Dorward et al., 2009; Andersson-Djurfeldt, 2013; 
2014), sometimes together with a recognition that many 
or most of them are not able to prosper in the conditions 
of today’s ‘real markets’. For example, in a paper arguing 
for a viable future for small-scale farming in SSA, 
Wiggins (2009, pp. 14, 15, 16) suggests that the “bulk 
of marketed output from small farms comes from those 
that are towards the upper part of the range”, that “most 
of the increased production, and hence increased 
earnings will accrue to only a minority of small farms”, 
and that “it is likely that it will be a minority of small farms 
that see the bulk of added production and sales”.
These are salutary steps beyond inherited assumptions 
within social science and policy discourses of small 
farmers as an essentially homogeneous category of 
producers and market actors. They do not, however, 
point in the direction of explaining differences among 
small farmers in terms of the resources they command 
(notably but not exclusively land and labour) and 
the connected issue of their relative strengths or 
weaknesses in markets (however informal). 
A key step in that direction is to consider how 
‘heterogeneity’ within the same populations of ‘small 
farmers’ might be the effect of tendencies towards 
systematic, and indeed systemic, class differences and 
differentiation among them. As commodity producers/
market actors within generalized commodity relations, 
they have to reproduce both their means of production 
(tools, seeds, fertilizer) and themselves (everyday 
12 It is also important to emphasize the lack of systematic empirical evidence, as well as common problems of method, in research on agrarian change in SSA, 
not least the operations of its changing ‘real markets’ (Oya, 2013; Cramer et al., 2014). 
13 With a strong echo of the perspective of de Soto (1989),Vorley et al. (2012) is a summary of findings from the Knowledge Programme on ‘Small Producer 
Agency in the Globalised Market’, a joint initiative of the International Institute for Environment and Development and HIVOS. 
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consumption and generational reproduction).14 Some, 
typically a minority, are able to accumulate resources 
and to enlarge their scale of farming, eventually 
becoming capitalist farmers; others manage to 
reproduce themselves as both capital and labour at 
a constant level; while many, in some countrysides 
a majority, are unable to reproduce their means of 
production and hence have to look for other sources of 
income than their farming to survive.15
This perspective on class differences/differentiation 
among small farmers, presented so schematically here, 
can bear at least a little elaboration within the current 
limits of space. First, the necessity for ‘small farmers’ to 
reproduce their means of production can involve them 
in sometimes intense local competition over resources 
of land and labour, which both reflects and further 
stimulates processes of their class differentiation. 
Competition over land for cultivation and/or livestock 
does not require formal markets and land title but is 
typically pursued through ‘vernacular land markets’ in 
SSA (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2007). As a local 
village capitalist in northern Uganda in the early 1980s 
said, in a vivid expression of class differentiation: “What 
helped us [to accumulate] was the famine of 1980. 
People were hungry and they sold us things cheaply 
[including land and cattle]. That is when we really 
started buying.” (Mamdani, 1987, p. 208). 
Second, the need for some small farmers to sell their 
labour power to others who employ wage labour on 
their farms is also manifest in highly informal labour 
markets pervasive in rural SSA, however neglected 
by researchers, development practitioners and 
policymakers (Oya, 2013). Command over labour is 
also highly gendered in rural SSA, of course, as are 
other aspects of relations of production, reproduction, 
property and power among small farmers. A third 
and ubiquitous issue then is how class and gender 
differentiation in farming intersect and combine 
(O’Laughlin, 2007). 
Fourth, access to food and the class dynamics of food 
markets also have serious implications for processes of 
social differentiation and impoverishment of the most 
vulnerable. Thus, deepened differentiation resulting in 
episodes of starvation are intimately associated with 
the functioning of ‘real markets’ in the context of very 
unequal levels of power between accumulating classes 
(often involved in the food trade) and extremely deprived 
people dependent on food market purchases for their 
survival, as documented in the case of recent famine 
episodes in niger (Oya, 2010). 
Finally, as a corollary of all these phenomena, few small 
farmers in SSA (and few farmers anywhere in the world) 
reproduce themselves solely through their own farming. 
It is this topic of ‘livelihood diversification’ or so-called 
‘pluriactivity’ that we comment on next.
Markets and ‘livelihood 
diversification’
The diversification of rural livelihoods, sometimes 
termed ‘pluriactivity’ or referred to as ‘de-agrarianization’ 
– the combination of farming with off-farm activities 
in a range of markets– is widely recognized (see 
Ellis, 1998; Bryceson, 2002, Barrett et al, 2005,for 
comprehensive reviews). The potentially synergic 
linkages between agricultural and non-farm activities 
have also been acknowledged by the literature for some 
time (Haggblade et al., 1989). Vorley et al. (2012) note 
that “small farmers may act, serially or simultaneously, 
in markets, both rural and urban, formal and informal, 
or local and global” (p. 17), and that “smallholders as a 
group get large portions of income outside agriculture” 
(p. 9). 
This has also a spatial dimension that goes beyond 
the ‘rural’, as Andersson-Djurfeldt (2014) argues: “The 
emergence of multi-local livelihoods, hence, is tied 
to growing insecurity in both rural and urban areas, 
making the classical distinctions between rural and 
urban obsolete, at least in the realities of the lives of the 
poor” (p. 3). Many small farmers in various areas of SSA 
have indeed long combined the incomes from ‘wage 
and hoe’ (Cordell et al., 1996), and such diversification 
is no doubt growing in importance. Allowing for the 
dangers of such ‘jumbo’ statistics, the World Bank 
(2007, p. 205) suggested that the share of the adult 
rural population in SSA with own-account farming as 
its primary economic activity, while the highest of any 
region, is just over half for both men (56.6 percent) and 
women (53.5 percent).
However, patterns of diversification, the reasons for 
them and the kinds of market activity they encompass, 
are shaped by the processes of differentiation 
discussed above. Diversification may be driven by 
imperatives of both accumulation and survival, which 
depend on ‘real markets’ in different ways and on 
different terms. Capitalist farmers emerging from the 
ranks of smallholders often invest in activities ancillary 
to farming like crop trading and processing, rural retail 
trade and transport, and advancing credit, as well as 
14 This does not mean that they necessarily reproduce themselves entirely through commodity exchange (does anyone?) but that they cannot do so outside 
commodity exchange/markets, even when they ‘are not fully commercialised’ (Vorley et al., 2012, p. 9).
15 This classification corresponds to, and reformulates, ‘classic’ schemas of the class differentiation of rich, middle class and poor ‘peasants’, the last sometimes 
termed ‘marginal farmers’ (see Bernstein, 2010; Byres 2003b;NCEUS, 2007). In a different vein and within a different analytical framework, Dorward (2009) 
and Dorward et al. (2009) write about livelihood strategies of the ‘poor’ as choosing between ‘hanging in’, i.e. maintaining/protecting social reproduction, 
‘stepping up’, i.e. accumulating and expanding within one’s own set of activities, and ‘stepping out’ as accumulating into different livelihoods. Of course, these are 
no more than aspirations and often people may “fail in these strategies, and ‘falling down and/or out’ is all too common” (Dorward, 2009, p. 136).
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renting out draft animals and tractors or selling irrigation 
water (Oya, 2007b). They also invest in urban activities, 
education for their sons and good marriages for their 
daughters, alliances with government officials, and in 
political processes and influence more generally. In 
short, they engage in ‘diversification for accumulation’ 
(Hart, 1994). 
Medium smallholders typically rely on combining farming 
with ‘off-farm’ activities, including labour migration, as a 
source of income to invest in farm production, especially 
when its costs of reproduction are rising (neven et al., 
2009). Their farming practice also typically rests on 
the capacity to hire wage labour, provided by landless 
workers or marginal farmers (who are often migrants); in 
short, those ‘too poor to farm’ on a scale necessary for 
their reproduction. Wage labour may be hired to replace 
family labour that is engaged in other ‘off-farm’ activities 
or to augment family labour at moments of peak demand 
in the farming calendar for activities like weeding and 
harvesting (kevane, 1994; Mduma and Wobst, 2005; 
Oya, 2013). 
Diversification by poor or marginal farmers for reasons 
of survival, primarily through seeking wage employment 
– however insecure, poorly paid or hazardous– 
is now acknowledged, however belatedly, by 
organizations like the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development(IFAD) which noted that the rural poor 
“live mainly by selling their labour-power” (IFAD, 
2001,p. 230) and the World Bank (2007, chapter 9). 
This recognition has led Olivier De Schutter (2009) to 
suggest that “the distinction between waged workers 
and farmers is breaking down” (cited by Vorley et al., 
2012, p. 9), which we would agree is the case for poor 
farmers in SSA. 
By considering livelihood diversification through the 
lens of rural social differentiation, we can get a more 
accurate picture than we would by simply applauding 
diversification as the agency of small farmers and 
analyzing the role of markets in terms of how they 
support or constrain diversification.16 While it is true 
that “migration and off-farm jobs are not necessarily 
movements out of farming” (ibid, p. 15), the ways in 
which, and the degrees to which, market activity outside 
farming supports farm investment and growth, and 
for whom, should also be investigated and specified 
through the patterns and dynamics of differentiation. 
It cannot be assumed that labour migration and wage 
work demonstrate a commitment by all classes of rural 
populations to farming as their preferred vocation.17
16 For example: “Diversification brings versatility and resilience; small farmers can, and do, reinvent themselves frequently in the face of change by adjusting their 
portfolios of activities” (Vorley et al., 2012, p 17).
17 As suggested for rural labour migration in China, for example, by Ploeg and Ye (2010).
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Conclusion: policy, 
reality and paradox
We indicated above the policy implications of 
‘market-friendly’ (or ‘market-embracing’) and ‘market-
challenging’ perspectives. The former are premised on 
the view that market dynamics of competition, and its 
incentives and rewards for entrepreneurial activity, are 
the drivers of economic growth. Its policy implications 
thus centre on a range of measures, which have been 
illustrated: (i) to remove/reduce obstacles to better 
functioning markets, notably various forms of ‘distortion’ 
generated by state regulation and interventions more 
generally; and (ii) to strengthen markets through specific 
institutional reforms and innovations, in this case 
through improving the conditions of participation by 
small farmers. Market-challenging perspectives contest 
current dynamics attributed to neoliberal globalization, 
in the interests of small farmers, the rural poor, and the 
poor more generally. Their policy implications centre on: 
(i) means to control the negative effects of international 
trade and inward investment, and their ‘distortions’; and 
(ii) building on actual or potential resistance of small 
farmers to globalization through social movements 
committed to alternative ways of production and 
exchange, of which food sovereignty is emblematic. 
At the same time, we have observed some of the 
realities of policy as a discursive realm in which 
proposed ‘innovations’ so often mask fundamental 
continuities; for example, the much-debated shift from 
a ‘Washington consensus’ to a ‘post-Washington 
consensus’. Moreover, it has become increasingly 
clear to us that both market-embracing and market-
challenging perspectives achieve their conceptual 
congruity – a very different matter from their 
effectiveness in practice – through the lack of distance 
between their analytical frameworks and their policy 
prescriptions. The connection in one case is faith 
in the virtues of markets, in the other case, it is faith 
in the virtues of small farmers as exemplars of ‘the 
peasant way’. 
Can the policy implications of agrarian political 
economy be similarly deduced? Paradoxically perhaps, 
the political economy view of real markets we have 
proposed is much more agnostic about policy 
‘solutions’ than the market-embracing and market-
challenging perspectives. Although there are some 
common traits among those who work within a political 
economy or heterodox development economics 
tradition, disagreements over the rationale and 
impacts of interventions and whom they target can be 
substantial. If there is a consensus among heterodox 
political economists, it is that state intervention in 
one form or another has been central to processes 
of structural transformation and indeed to agricultural 
transformations, whether for long-term agrarian 
transitions or medium-term agrarian development 
challenges (Byres, 2003b; Chang, 2009). 
Stressing the centrality of state intervention in rural 
development does not necessarily mean fewer markets, 
as in a zero-sum game; since state interventions can 
contribute to the creation or transformation of markets, 
and since political economists generally do not accept 
an analytical dichotomy of state versus market. The key 
questions are ‘markets for whom?’, ‘state interventions 
on whose behalf?’, ‘for whose benefit?’, and ‘with what 
likely effects?’ This is where disagreements emerge, 
especially in relation to the type of development 
RuRal futuRes | How mucH sHould markets rule?
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aspirations and agrarian model that are favoured. 
Thus, while many radical scholars, particularly on the 
Indian Left, favour a state that directly supports small 
farmers by subsidising and protecting them from the 
tentacles of neoliberal globalization, or more radical 
collective solutions in a Maoist tradition, others are far 
less convinced by continuous, and ultimately ineffective, 
support to a small-farm development path. Instead, 
they advocate state interventions that foster and at the 
same time discipline the development of capitalism 
in agriculture.18
18  For a discussion of the complex politics of small farming (petty commodity production) in India see Harriss-White (2012) and her discussion of Williams’s 
(1982) arguments for Africa in relation to the Indian context. For the non-pro-small farmer policy perspectives see Sender and Johnston (2004) and other 
contributions to the special issue on land reform in the Journal of Agrarian Change 4 (1, 2) in 2004.
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